If I didn't have such an ordinary brain I might understand whatever you have to say. <grin> Just kidding. I think we'd all agree. Definitely, there are some interesting conjecture to be assumed. For one, Boeing is desperate to find fact asap, and hope to mitigate liability and those seeking damages. For other reasons some players might relish the current situation and hope to prolong the discomfort, eh? In the interest of due process I think the recorders should be delivered directly to Boeing. I'm sure they'd love to spin the facts but I doubt there's any possible way to do that now.

(Written on 2019年 03月 14日)(Permalink)

Let me rephrase my comment: What I meant to say is that now we have software routines that try to fix inherently unstable or flawed design. While that *can* work you better hope the right seat has had in-depth training and real-world manual flying skill.

(Written on 2019年 03月 14日)(Permalink)

Exactly. Early automation was a huge boon allowing you to relax a bit, do some things. But it's gone too far now, trying to make a graceful bird out of inherently unstabilized aerodynamics.

(Written on 2019年 03月 14日)(Permalink)

I tend to agree with your assumption as I wouldn't think there's anything proprietary. At least there shouldn't be, but who knows; I can understand if Boeing would prefer direct and immediate access. Also, we're all just guessing MCAS is involved. That's my guess too, but pointing an arrow directly is premature at this early stage. Personally, I wonder if there could be a single master switch that would gracefully, yet immediately, remove as many overrides as possible and return critical functions to manual control? Better yet, install optical devices and AI software that interface with the already included warning systems to function much like the latest Air Force CFIT detection.

(Written on 2019年 03月 14日)(Permalink)

You're either biased or ignoring, or are ignorant of previous flawed decisions by Boeing management, the LiOn battery debacle for one. The attempt to break the unions could arguably be thrown at their feet, too, as well as other relatively recent situations. The new MAX MCAS software routine is, perhaps, one more digital bandaid too many. I don't know how anyone can be fully versant and prepared for so many possible software interactions. Pity the poor commercial airline pilot.

(Written on 2019年 03月 13日)(Permalink)

Today's digital cockpit and controlling software is so complex with inter-referenced and co-dependant line after line of 'if-this-then-that- code... even the programmers can become unresponsive. Add to this where the manufacturer -apparently- was vague regarding a critical system and you get a situation where training is in constant update mode, and pilots overwhelmed, under-informed, and behind the automation curve. Here's just one example, maybe not totally relevant but is why I am so negative: A decade ago I sat down to parse the control logic of a much simpler circuit description. After a half-day I felt like I had gone stupid because it made no sense. I kept thinking it must be me because the manufacture would surely know their product. Right? Wrong. Turns-out if I reversed a single "off" for "on" the routine then worked logically. It was a typo.

(Written on 2019年 03月 12日)(Permalink)

thanks Brian for that. You make it sound easy, I don't think it is and hats-off to you who can pull it off.

(Written on 2019年 02月 27日)(Permalink)

It's hard to make a compelling point in 15 seconds. I think these ads are smart and cute without being pretentious or smarmy.

(Written on 2019年 02月 27日)(Permalink)

I agree, this is very fun stuff. Nice work!

(Written on 2019年 02月 27日)(Permalink)

"Why"?..?? Efficiencies of power extraction (for the same amount of fuel) is the driver of new design, competition is the driver for multiple suppliers.

(Written on 2019年 02月 16日)(Permalink)