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FAA suspends 2nd air traffic controller
WASHINGTON (AP) — Federal aviation officials have suspended a Florida air traffic controller following an incident in which two planes came too close together. The suspension is the second in a week i . . . (flightaware.com) 更多...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Upon reading about this incident, I was reminded of a similar situation I found myself in on Nov. 21, 1983:
I was the CIC (controller in charge) during an evening shift at GRB Tower/ Approach Control (Green Bay, WI). I was also working the radar position responsible for all IFR flights in GRB airspace both for GRB airport, satellite airports, and over flights through GRB airspace. I was responsible for the handling of N9232M a MO20 which had departed CLI (Clintonville Airport) bound for MWC (Milwaukee Timmerman Airport). I had completed a radar handoff with Chicago Center on this flight and transferred communications of N32M to the ZAU controller. After several minutes, the ZAU controller called me on the coordination line to ask if I had “shipped” N9232M to their frequency to which I replied in the affirmative. After another period of minutes both ZAU and I noticed the aircraft to begin making wide left turns and remain level at 7,000 feet right at the boundary of GRB/ZAU airspace. Over the course of the next hour, both ZAU and I attempted to make radio contact with the MO20 on ZAU frequencies, guard frequency, FSS frequencies, GRB and OSH VOR frequencies, and of course all GRB frequencies. Nothing! All actions to attempt radio contact failed. The MO20 continued to make wide turns (about 8 miles in diameter), and the winds aloft were continually blowing the aircraft to the east towards Lake Michigan. At some point an Air Wisconsin BA46 contacted me to request practice training maneuvers in GRB airspace which I approved and initiated radar contact with that AWI flight to issue traffic advisories. The MO20 just continued circling and drifting closer to Lake Michigan so I asked the AWI pilot if he could assist me by attempting to ascertain if the pilot was OK. AWI agreed so I vectored him to the MO20. When the AWI pilot asked what he could do, I suggested he approach the MO20 from a safe angle and use his landing light to gain the attention of the pilot. The AWI pilot performed this maneuver and reported he could see the pilot but that he did not respond to the bright light and appeared not to be moving at all. AWI offered to remain in visual contact with the MO20 from a safe distance until the event resolved or AWI became low on fuel. I decided to call the Coast Guard and request they respond to the area of Lake Michigan off shore of MTW (Manitowoc) and standby for further developments. At some point I received a call from the AWI pilot that the MO20 had begun a descending spiral and appeared to be headed for the water. The MO20 did splashdown in the lake about three miles off shore. I marked the spot on my radar scope with a grease pencil and the AWI pilot provided me with radial/DME information off both GRB and OSH VORs. This data was relayed to the Coast Guard who subsequently found a fuel slick at the coordinates we provided. For more information on this accident visit:
http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=36698
Legal resolution for the victim’s family proceeded quickly due to the voice tapes, AWI pilot observations and Coast Guard findings. I was given a Special Achievement Award based in part on my actions of this tragic evening.
Now to apply my experience to the publicized actions of the Central Florida Supervisor/Controller, it is my opinion that he was attempting to do something similar to what I had done so many years ago. The action was conducted safely and the outcome ended happily……. Almost! It is reported that the Supervisor was suspended as were the SWA pilots. This to me is not a good outcome, for as controllers and pilots encounter similar unusual situations in the future, they may not be interested in trying to resolve them for fear of punishment from the FAA. I do agree that an investigation into the incident is in order and that a “lessons learned” attitude would be sufficient to describe different ways to have handled the situation. But…I suggest that the investigation is an exercise in hind sight and was conducted by people not involved with the incident in real time and who quite possibly have never had such an experience themselves. I would call for them to place themselves in the position of the controller or pilot as the incident was underway and see if they might have a different perspective on the actions taken. I suggest actions were being taken to ascertain the “health” of the Cirrus pilot and other necessary information (including the possibility of the aircraft descending into a populated area) prior to calling for fighter intercept.
Let me add one more excerpt from the FAO 7110.65 air traffic control manual to those of rjb4000:
“10-1-1. EMERGENCY DETERMINATIONS
a. An emergency can be either a Distress or an
Urgency condition as defined in the “Pilot/Controller
Glossary.”
b. A pilot who encounters a Distress condition
should declare an emergency by beginning the initial
communication with the word “Mayday,” preferably
repeated three times. For an Urgency condition, the
word “Pan‐Pan” should be used in the same manner.
c. If the words “Mayday” or “Pan‐Pan” are not
used and you are in doubt that a situation constitutes
an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as
though it were an emergency.
d. Because of the infinite variety of possible
emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be
prescribed. However, when you believe an emergency
exists or is imminent, select and pursue a
course of action which appears to be most appropriate
under the circumstances and which most nearly
conforms to the instructions in this manual.
REFERENCEFAAO
JO 7110.65, Para 9-2-7, IFR Military Training Routes.
10-1-2. OBTAINING INFORMATION
Obtain enough information to handle the emergency
intelligently. Base your decision as to what type of
assistance is needed on information and requests
received from the pilot because he/she is authorized
by 14 CFR Part 91 to determine a course of action.”
I would hope that the disciplinary actions taken against the controller and pilots would be revisited and possibly rescinded for in my opinion, they were not operating recklessly or without due regard for safety. Quite the contrary, it seems to me. I think they were attempting to resolve the situation in a safe manner and operated in a reasonable manner.
A retired air traffic controller.
I was the CIC (controller in charge) during an evening shift at GRB Tower/ Approach Control (Green Bay, WI). I was also working the radar position responsible for all IFR flights in GRB airspace both for GRB airport, satellite airports, and over flights through GRB airspace. I was responsible for the handling of N9232M a MO20 which had departed CLI (Clintonville Airport) bound for MWC (Milwaukee Timmerman Airport). I had completed a radar handoff with Chicago Center on this flight and transferred communications of N32M to the ZAU controller. After several minutes, the ZAU controller called me on the coordination line to ask if I had “shipped” N9232M to their frequency to which I replied in the affirmative. After another period of minutes both ZAU and I noticed the aircraft to begin making wide left turns and remain level at 7,000 feet right at the boundary of GRB/ZAU airspace. Over the course of the next hour, both ZAU and I attempted to make radio contact with the MO20 on ZAU frequencies, guard frequency, FSS frequencies, GRB and OSH VOR frequencies, and of course all GRB frequencies. Nothing! All actions to attempt radio contact failed. The MO20 continued to make wide turns (about 8 miles in diameter), and the winds aloft were continually blowing the aircraft to the east towards Lake Michigan. At some point an Air Wisconsin BA46 contacted me to request practice training maneuvers in GRB airspace which I approved and initiated radar contact with that AWI flight to issue traffic advisories. The MO20 just continued circling and drifting closer to Lake Michigan so I asked the AWI pilot if he could assist me by attempting to ascertain if the pilot was OK. AWI agreed so I vectored him to the MO20. When the AWI pilot asked what he could do, I suggested he approach the MO20 from a safe angle and use his landing light to gain the attention of the pilot. The AWI pilot performed this maneuver and reported he could see the pilot but that he did not respond to the bright light and appeared not to be moving at all. AWI offered to remain in visual contact with the MO20 from a safe distance until the event resolved or AWI became low on fuel. I decided to call the Coast Guard and request they respond to the area of Lake Michigan off shore of MTW (Manitowoc) and standby for further developments. At some point I received a call from the AWI pilot that the MO20 had begun a descending spiral and appeared to be headed for the water. The MO20 did splashdown in the lake about three miles off shore. I marked the spot on my radar scope with a grease pencil and the AWI pilot provided me with radial/DME information off both GRB and OSH VORs. This data was relayed to the Coast Guard who subsequently found a fuel slick at the coordinates we provided. For more information on this accident visit:
http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=36698
Legal resolution for the victim’s family proceeded quickly due to the voice tapes, AWI pilot observations and Coast Guard findings. I was given a Special Achievement Award based in part on my actions of this tragic evening.
Now to apply my experience to the publicized actions of the Central Florida Supervisor/Controller, it is my opinion that he was attempting to do something similar to what I had done so many years ago. The action was conducted safely and the outcome ended happily……. Almost! It is reported that the Supervisor was suspended as were the SWA pilots. This to me is not a good outcome, for as controllers and pilots encounter similar unusual situations in the future, they may not be interested in trying to resolve them for fear of punishment from the FAA. I do agree that an investigation into the incident is in order and that a “lessons learned” attitude would be sufficient to describe different ways to have handled the situation. But…I suggest that the investigation is an exercise in hind sight and was conducted by people not involved with the incident in real time and who quite possibly have never had such an experience themselves. I would call for them to place themselves in the position of the controller or pilot as the incident was underway and see if they might have a different perspective on the actions taken. I suggest actions were being taken to ascertain the “health” of the Cirrus pilot and other necessary information (including the possibility of the aircraft descending into a populated area) prior to calling for fighter intercept.
Let me add one more excerpt from the FAO 7110.65 air traffic control manual to those of rjb4000:
“10-1-1. EMERGENCY DETERMINATIONS
a. An emergency can be either a Distress or an
Urgency condition as defined in the “Pilot/Controller
Glossary.”
b. A pilot who encounters a Distress condition
should declare an emergency by beginning the initial
communication with the word “Mayday,” preferably
repeated three times. For an Urgency condition, the
word “Pan‐Pan” should be used in the same manner.
c. If the words “Mayday” or “Pan‐Pan” are not
used and you are in doubt that a situation constitutes
an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as
though it were an emergency.
d. Because of the infinite variety of possible
emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be
prescribed. However, when you believe an emergency
exists or is imminent, select and pursue a
course of action which appears to be most appropriate
under the circumstances and which most nearly
conforms to the instructions in this manual.
REFERENCEFAAO
JO 7110.65, Para 9-2-7, IFR Military Training Routes.
10-1-2. OBTAINING INFORMATION
Obtain enough information to handle the emergency
intelligently. Base your decision as to what type of
assistance is needed on information and requests
received from the pilot because he/she is authorized
by 14 CFR Part 91 to determine a course of action.”
I would hope that the disciplinary actions taken against the controller and pilots would be revisited and possibly rescinded for in my opinion, they were not operating recklessly or without due regard for safety. Quite the contrary, it seems to me. I think they were attempting to resolve the situation in a safe manner and operated in a reasonable manner.
A retired air traffic controller.
It's always easy to say what you would have done or what another should have done..... The key point is that "BOTH PLANES LANDED SAFELY." a perfect endiing.......
As far as we know the Cirrus pilot may have been sleeping and awakened by the airliner... We should not be so quick to judge others until we have been in their situation.....
As far as the Cirrus pilot I stated that "If any disciplinary action is needed it should be directed toward the Cirrus pilot "IF HIS OR HER RADIO WAS IN FACT OPERABLE." I personally do not feel that there should have been any disciplinary action taken against either aircraft or the controller. I commend the controller and the airliner pilot for taking the initiative and the effort to assist a possible fellow pilot in need.
The 737 chose to not only assist ATC but to assist another pilot or aircraft that may have been in distress. The airliner pilot could have easily denied the request had he deemed it unsafe for his passengers and crew. However, obviously he felt that he maintained a safe distance and it apparently proved productive as the article states that the Cirrus made contact within 30 seconds of the visual.
I had a single engine aircraft, IFR at 5000, have an engine failure. As luck would have it, he was near a small (unattended) airport. After I pointed him toward the airport, he got too low for radio communication and eventually I lost radar contact.
I had a (Airline name withheld) DC-9 in the area, so I asked him if he could try to contact the aircraft on guard and Unicom, to get a status report (the CIC had already alerted the sheriff). He was unable to establish comm., so he asked for a vector to where we last had radar contact, at MVA, to see if he could see anything.
At this point, the Captain took the initiative, concerned for the downed aircraft’s pilot and passengers, canceled IFR so he could go a bit lower. He was able to locate the airplane and radioed everyone appeared to have survived. I suspect what made a major difference was (the Captain later told us) he involved the passengers and told them he needed their help to look for a plane that just crashed, while he flew low over the site.
Because of his support, authorities were able to get to the downed aircraft sooner. I suspect, in today’s environment, volunteers will not be so forth coming.