This sounds like the same rationale for "old timer" pilots that didn't like other "crutches" in newer aircraft. Before VORs were deployed, pilots at the time probably saw them as crutches. Imagine their dismay at GPS and WAAS. De-icing? Ha! Wimps!
The Cirrus is a nice plane. It handles well, and is comfortable for pilots and passengers alike. There was a lot of attention paid to making things easier for the pilot, and it has continued to evolve along that line. Why is this a bad thing? That said, there is an argument to be made that the delta between everything being right on the easy to fly aircraft, and system malfunctions on the same leave such a wide delta, that the workload could be substantially higher.
Yeah, using the parachute as a crutch is seriously flawed. I don't own a Cirrus, but I fly one. It never once occurred to me that I should fly it because it has a parachute. (I will admit, however, that telling my friends/passengers that it's there has helped them overcome t
Back seat pilots. Without knowing what was in his head at the time, it is clear that he felt the best course of action was to pull the chute. When in IMC without basic instruments, and lack of supporting instruments, I don't know that the decision was a wrong decision. That is the point of the chute.
Having had an HSI failure, in a Cirrus, I can say it is not as straight forward as one would believe. The moving map is slaved to the HSI in the model I was flying. The GPS screens are in the middle, and hard to use for nav (they're not a part of any normal scan). The compass is even more awkwardly placed. It was a high workload. Coupling that with a suspected attitude indicator failure, i have no doubt that the guy was taxed.
We can all say "what about the turn indicator" or other comments. But, without actually being in the situation, it is truly back seat piloting. I think it's a bit harsh to say he wasn't skilled. And, who's to say that pulling the chute is unnecessary? I'd rather
Yes, the ongoing reduction in pay/benefits is a lousy deal. It is not, however, limited to pilots at American...or even airlines in general. I read, below, a comment that people were being asked to do more with fewer people. Welcome to the 21st century. The question one must ask is whether there were inefficiencies that allowed a bloated workforce to form. (I don't know, nor do I have enough insight to form an opinion.) I have to say, however, it does feel like the unions involved in these actions are a bit behind the times.
I was affected by these problems last week. On Sunday, I received an automated call from American telling me that my flight on Monday was canceled. But, not to worry--they'd booked me on another flight. In their mind, all was great. Never mind the fact that my new arrival time was 2.5 hours past what I'd originally booked. Then, on my way to the airport on Monday morning, I received a text message from TripIt telling me that my flight was canceled. (No call from
I believe there was a declared emergency (though perhaps not in the excerpt), as the controller asked the pilot what the nature of his emergency was. It is unlikely that the controller is going to ask that question, absent an emergency.
Most striking in this, to me, is the need for two go-arounds. I believe it would probably have been three, had the controller given permission for a second 360. (Clearly, the first 360 didn't work out so well.) Handling workload is indeed taxed in this scenario. However, that is one of the reasons for two trained pilots. The FAA thought of high-workload environments.
What I don't understand is why it escalated into this at all. Instead of requesting the first 360, do a missed approach, go into a hold, and request clearance for another approach when the checklists and configuration meets the specifications required for that type of landing. Given DFW's altitude, it is unlikely that the altitude for a hold in a missed approach procedure would be high