The Comet and Electra had tough starts, the Electra still is flying. The MAX is a keeper. Sloppy design and sloppier planning doomed the two that crashed. Had their been a type rating required, likely two loads of poor souls would still be breathing.....Boeing deserves everything it is getting.

(Written on 2020年 02月 14日)(Permalink)

The Max is nothing like the classic. Any reasonable person would know that. The new landing gear and pitch rate make it stand alone. That said, it is up to the FAA to mandate a new Type rating, something they should not farm back to Boeing.

(Written on 2020年 02月 08日)(Permalink)

Yes, they will. I don’t like the sole source AoA data, but the fix is as with any trim runaway. Disable the trim motors. Confidence and competence should be on every checklist.

(Written on 2020年 02月 07日)(Permalink)

Well, looking for an inop light bulb put a 1011 into the swamp. Seriously, are we seeing the results of a regulator being found to be stupid, and lazy? Enough fox/henhouse drama. Get this aircraft back into revenue flight, and stop posturing....

(Written on 2020年 02月 07日)(Permalink)

The two flight crews experienced a systems failure. They saw the results, but not the cause. Until they ran out of trim to correct a persistent Nose Down, they thought (sic) the solution was working. Even had they known that MCAS had failed, they had no training how to correct the condition, which we can call “runaway trim”, because we see the results of MCAS Fail. “Automatic Stall Prevention” was not necessary, but it activated, and continued to function until impact, The sensor supplying critical Angle of Attack data to MCAS was reading ten degrees high. It is a dumb machine, it cannot fly “seat of the pants”. The uproar is that crews were not fully in the know regarding MCAS, and it was not trained. Turns out the solution is a simple one, but needs to happen without delay. The cause of this systems failure is not acceptable, and until Boeing changes the system, it will not fly again. imo. My conclusion is that something was missing from the syllabus upon which a transitioning

(Written on 2019年 10月 31日)(Permalink)

JMartinson. You asked a question about MCAS which showed some ignorance of flight systems. If you believe Boeing made clear to all flight crews the function of the Stall recovery system, you should be incensed at Boeing’s admitting guilt that they did not. Similarly, have you some idea why the type is grounded, save a few tail numbers? Clean slate, then? Enlighten us.

(Written on 2019年 10月 31日)(Permalink)

Are you a pilot?

(Written on 2019年 10月 30日)(Permalink)

Show the pertinent contents of the “service manual”. Which is not the “operators manual.” United pilots still fly some MAX today. The issue is not for the shop, but for the Pilots, and the QRH. Both third world A/C were absent the pertinent entry. AFAIK. The CEO is testifying before Congress as I write, accepting all blame. BTW, Boeing represents the issue as a “software glitch”, which is another discussion. They volunteered that for what I take as several “explanations.” Jail? Whomever is responsible for lack of required data. Violation of Federal Aviation Law can certainly be charged as a felony. If non compliance was willful, and attorneys can link certain individuals to motive, Manslaughter comes to mind.

(Written on 2019年 10月 29日)(Permalink)

You say: “....I really don't know how to answer that. I don't understand why MCAS or any other kind of auto trim system with that much authority would ever be active at low altitude, but then again I don't design or fly airliners...” The answer is in my reply, above. My question: Can you read your own posts? Find “Alpha Prot.” Alpha is Greek for AoA. (Angle of Attack). The THS (Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer) has “That much authority” because it trims the airplane without using high tail down force (nose up). Likewise it trims for Nose Down by lowering its trailing edge, again, slightly. The control surface moves slowly, and with annunciation on the flight deck. Letting the horizontal get too powerful is dangerous, as we see in both these crashes.

(Written on 2019年 10月 28日)(Permalink)

The discussion is, and should be, focused on MCAS and the fallout from its lack of exposure to flight crews. Why wouldn’t an automatic Stall prevention system be on board? Especially at low altitude, flaps out, and dirty? Airbus has it in Normal Law: Alpha Prot.

(Written on 2019年 10月 28日)(Permalink)