Not sure if serious or trolling...

(Written on 2021年 01月 02日)(Permalink)

That is a pretty egregious distortion of the facts. That 15 crashes figure comes from an internal FAA review after the first crash. All they basically did was look at how many flights/hours the type had flown when it crashed, and interpolated that over the projected lifespan of the fleet. That doesn't take into account improved knowledge, training, and aircraft updates. So to essentially suggest that Boeing knew the airplane would probably crash that many times and simply ignored it is disingenuous at best.

(Written on 2021年 01月 02日)(Permalink)

False. Though to be fair the reporting on this is absolutely horrible, to no ones surprise. They got a low hydraulic pressure indication on the left side, which is no big deal. Then they got a fuel imbalance on the left side, which again is no big deal by itself, you can rebalance by using the cross feed. However it appears they suspected a fuel leak, there are no details as to why but the checklist mentions a 500 pound change in 30 minutes or less. In the case of a leak the checklist directs you to shutdown the affected side engine to hopefully contain the leak. And whenever a 2 engine airplane becomes a single engine airplane you are directed to land at the nearest “suitable airport”, which is what prompted the diversion. This article provides the basic details, but that’s about it. https://www.aviation24.be/airlines/air-canada/boeing-737-8-max-suffers-hydraulic-fault-shuts-down-left-hand-engine-on-return-to-service-flight/

(Written on 2021年 01月 01日)(Permalink)

Then perhaps those people should be asking questions and doing some research on their own instead of accusing Boeing of murder and calling the Max a death trap. Just a thought.

(Written on 2021年 01月 01日)(Permalink)

There won’t be any of these pilots in US carriers’ cockpits for two reasons: one, every major airline prohibits anyone who is not a currently employed pilot with that airline from occupying a pilot station. So even a flight attendant technically cannot sit in a pilot seat while in flight. And two, in order to occupy a flight deck observer seat one must be on a short list of qualified personnel, and Boeing employees are not on that list. They could however be present for simulator or other ground training events. I would guess the vast majority will go to foreign operators like you suggest, which honesty is where they’re really needed anyway.

(Written on 2020年 12月 26日)(Permalink)

Your last sentence does nothing but confirm your emotional detachment from any facts regarding the Max. I’ve flown it, and I’ll be flying it again sometime next year. There is nothing “unwieldy” about it, in fact it is more stable and balanced on the controls than earlier models. And there is nothing “radical” about the MCAS software. Boeing did manage to bungle what should’ve been a straightforward software program, but the fact of the matter is flight crew error was a large factor in both crashes. There wasn’t, and isn’t any stability issues with the Max. The sole purpose of MCAS is to meet a certification requirement for control force, that’s it. It’s not easier to stall, it doesn’t have different stall characteristics, and it’s not harder to recover should one ignore all the warnings and actually enter a stall. To suggest any different is to simply ignore the facts or fail to accept them when presented.

(Written on 2020年 12月 26日)(Permalink)

That article is so full of half-truths, exaggerations, and media panic porn it's not even funny. I'll be the first to admit the "new" PWB system was not without its teething problems, but there was nothing even close to "incredibly dangerous". There is always the possibility of human error(s), but the system itself is not flawed and I have no clue what "safety buffers" were supposedly removed. It's quite humorous how the FAA will literally freak out over minor paperwork issues, which is what happened when some aircraft's weight and balance were not updated properly. Keep in mind we're talking maybe a few hundred pounds at most compared to an empty weight close to 100,000 pounds. While at the same time the FAA still allows the use of average passenger weights, which includes carry-on luggage as that obviously isn't weighed at all. So each and every time an airliner takes off its actual weight will be at least a few hundred pounds different than its calculated weight based solely

(Written on 2020年 12月 21日)(Permalink)

Nothing like sensationalism by "keyboard warriors" who don't understand the facts and act out based on emotion.

(Written on 2020年 12月 19日)(Permalink)

This is the fundamental misunderstanding about the Max and MCAS. It has nothing to do with the aircraft’s stall behavior or response to a stall. MCAS only purpose is to artificially change elevator force based on certification requirements. The requirement is for elevator control force to increase as AOA increases towards a stall, making it harder to further increase AOA. Most aircraft, including previous 737 models accomplish this naturally through normal aerodynamics. However the Max failed to meet this requirement due to the new engines, the control force approaching a stall was too light. I’m not privy to all the possible solutions but obviously MCAS was the end result. Initially MCAS was only supposed to activate once per “event” and only have limited authority over the horizontal stabilizer. Somewhere in the process those limitations were removed, I haven’t delved deep enough into the investigation to figure out why. So the end result is that in the 2 crashes circumstances wer

(Written on 2020年 12月 06日)(Permalink)

The Max did, and does, have 2 AOA sensors. The problem, or one part of it, is that the system did not require both inputs to agree in order to activate MCAS. The systems are separate, the left side AOA signal goes to the Captain's instruments and the right side to the FO's. Also there was no alert to the pilots if the two sides disagreed, it was designed into the software but for some reason had not been activated yet. Obviously part of the fix(es) is to require both AOAs to be in agreement for MCAS to activate and the alert messaging is now active.

(Written on 2020年 12月 06日)(Permalink)